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The issue of migration and development is currently high on the agenda of
both development agencies and research institutes in several European
countries. It used to be discussed during the 1960/1970s within a framework
which, among others, comprised push-and pull factors in migration, brain
drain, remittances and return migration. Its return on the development
agenda occurs within the context of European post-modern societies, global-
ization and transnationalism. Key notions now are remittances and foreign
direct investment, knowledge transfer, brain gain, transnational entrepre-
neurship and diasporas.
This paper aims to explain the shifts in paradigms and discourses, with
reference to the European Union, and particularly in the Netherlands and
Germany. Research efforts and policy documents were scrutinized to trace
the shifts in discourses. Moreover, the role of different actors in the debate -
government agencies, migrant organizations, development funding agen-
cies, and research institutes – is explored.  Although some comparisons were
made with similar situations in other parts of the world, the paper focuses on
Asia-Europe migration. Although the migration and development debate
has acquired a more positive tone, the recognition of the potential of diasporas
for development varies by country context and policies have yet to integrate
migration and development issues in their frameworks.
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Introduction
The relationship between migration and development has re-emerged on
the agenda of researchers and policymakers dealing with development
issues. Governments, multilateral agencies, NGOs, academics and migrant
diasporas have joined the debate on the migration-development nexus (Van
Hear and Nyberg-Sorensen, 2003; Hugo, 2003).1 While the impacts of
migration on the development process of migrant sending countries in the
developing world had been acknowledged for quite some time, the jury is
out as to whether migration has a positive or negative impact on develop-
ment. What has been notable is the shift from a rather pessimistic tone to a
more optimistic appraisal in recent years.
According to Papademetriou and Martin (1991:5; 14) past analysis of the
effects of migration on the development of sending countries has been
erroneously narrowed down to a single element, such as brain drain or
migrants’ remittances, thereby glossing over the multidimensional nature
of the development process.2 Although these issues still figure prominently,
other themes are now under consideration. Framed within the new para-
digm of transnationalism, such themes include circular migration, brain
circulation, skill formation (Wicramasekara, 2003), migrant entrepreneur-
ship (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2003, Ammassari, 2004), transnational phi-
lanthropy (Opiniano, 2002), and the role of return migrants (Black et al.,
2003).
Despite possible analytical pitfalls of transnationalism, e.g., method-
ological nationalism or the glossing over of class differences and the impor-
tance of national regulations (Wimmer and  Glick Schiller, 2003; Waldinger
and Fitzgerald, 2004), this new paradigm has firmly linked development
with processes of globalization and global technological advances. Guarnizo
(2003) postulates that the existence of transnational communities, with a
drive to reproduce their socio-cultural practices abroad, stimulates business
in the country of origin. The migrant diaspora is an extended national
market and offers ample opportunities to create transnational businesses
and joint ventures. They can generate significant multi-directional flows of
1 The term “diaspora” is used here in a broad sense as we find it now in the literature. It refers
to the existence of communities living abroad. We are aware of  the  looser and watered-down
use of the term since it had for many years a religious connotation and was also  part of
geopolitical argumentation (see Lacoste, 1989)
2 Development subsumes issues such as sustainable environments, food security, female
empowerment, political empowerment, democratic values, health and education etc.
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commodities, capital, skills and ideas, contributing to social, political and
cultural linkages, in addition to economic impacts.
 This paper aims to clarify the shifts in discourses on migration and
development and to bring out the contrasts in experiences and thinking
about the theme. In the following sections, we will first discuss migration
and development on a more general theoretical level, after which policies
and programs in the EU are succinctly reviewed. An expose of the Dutch and
German debates follows, dealing with the main actors at the policy-level
and the empirical evidence that is reflected in academic debates.
The Changing Discourse on Migration and Development
Within the space of this article we cannot do justice to the vast literature and
variety of theoretical approaches, rather, we restrict ourselves to pointing to
some basic notions underlying the debate.3 Two contrasting theoretical
approaches formulated several decades ago exemplify the basic notions
that inform the thinking on the migration-development theme.
The first is the ‘balanced growth approach’ as represented by
Kindleberger (1965), and Griffin (1976). This approach, rooted in neo-liberal
economic theory, posits net positive effects of out-migration for the re-
gions/country of origin. The emigration of (surplus) labor from underde-
veloped, peripheral areas leads to a new equilibrium between capital and
labor that eventually fosters development. This line of reasoning emerged
within the context of high demand for unskilled labor in Western Europe
and the burgeoning labor forces in developing regions in the south (Martin,
1991:29). Kindleberger (1965) acknowledges possible negative effects, such
as direct loss of skilled labor and loss of production. But these are considered
short-term and the positive factors outweigh the negative ones in the long
term. Among the major arguments is the idea that out-migration leads to an
improvement in resource availability and income distribution in origin
areas. Since migrant labor is surplus labor or easily replaceable, there are no
major production losses. At the macro and micro levels, remittances contrib-
ute to a more favorable balance of payment situation, fosters consumption
and investment and improves the well-being of migrants households.
Moreover, economic growth can accelerate through incoming investment
capital and by the application of returning migrants skills and ideas.
3 For discussions of the theoretical literature in the field of migration and development we
refer to Martin (1991), Massey et al. (1998), Binford (2003); Van Hear and Nyberg-Sorensen
(2003).
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During the late 1970s and 1980s the second approach, the contrasting
‘asymmetrical growth approach,’ gained ground (Abadan-Unat et al., 1975;
Penninx and Van Velsen, 1977; Martin, 1991). The basic assumption is that
there is a link between underdevelopment in migrant sending regions and
development in receiving regions. This is manifested through an unbal-
anced distribution of benefits and resources, which is reinforced through
migration. Among others, this approach argues that migration is selective
and deprives the origin areas of their young, healthy, productive and
innovative workforce, subsequently resulting in changes in production and
a loss in productivity. Furthermore, the return benefits from the invest-
ments in human capital by the origin countries are foregone. As return
migration also includes those returning due to failure, illness or old age, it
does not contribute to productivity. Skill formation of migrants is limited
due to the nature of employment at the destination and acquired skills are
incompatible to the production systems in origin areas. This approach also
argues that remittances are insufficiently geared towards productive in-
vestment, but rather fuel consumption and price inflation and a greater
dependency on remittance income. Finally, at the community level, migra-
tion fosters greater socio-economic differentiation and social inequality.
In the 1980s and early 1990s the tone of the debate on migration and
development was still rather pessimistic. Papademetriou and Martin’s
(1991) influential study is emblematic: they concluded that migration has
rarely contributed significantly to economic take-off in origin areas. There-
fore Martin (1991:28) asserts that policies should stimulate the maximiza-
tion of benefits from remittances and the skills of return migrant, instead of
assuming that they will automatically contribute to development within
emigration regions.
However, the 1990s saw a shift towards a more optimistic discourse and
more studies emphasizing the positive impact of international migration, in
particular in relation to the impact of remittances for the local economy in
the areas of origin. It is argued that even consumptive expenditure of
remittances has positive multiplier effects, stimulating productivity and
employment. Given the poor, marginalized origins of migrants, earnings
from international migration reduce income disparities across class, re-
gional and rural-urban lines (Binford, 2003).
The World Bank Global Development Finance report (2003) gave this
positive stance more clout, by pointing to the large increase in remittances
in the 1990s, which even superseded the total  official development assis-
tance of developed countries. Remittances are considered as an alternative
form of (investment) capital for developing countries (Ratha, 2003). There is
also a growing awareness that “remittances” encompass more than money
transfers alone. As the president of the Inter-American Foundation (IAF)
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cogently stated “We have learned that remittances are not just financial
transfers but include “remittances” of new ideas and practices (for instance,
citizen participation or the role of women) and “remittances” of new skills
and experiences (for instance, construction techniques or computer applica-
tions) that can also be transferred to the “home-town” communities” (IAF,
2003).
The on-going academic discussion on transnationalism has widened
the perspective on the connections between migration and development.
Transnationalism advances that migration is not a unidimensional process
but rather entails the maintenance of multi-stranded economic and non-
economic relationships between home and host countries. This framework
contributed to a more positive viewpoint in the current migration-develop-
ment debate. In the past there was concern over the negative effects of brain-
drain, translating into policies aimed at restricting the emigration of highly-
skilled manpower, exacting compensation, or, alternatively, attempting to
retain these people through incentives. Currently, the debate is more bal-
anced and weighs the pros and cons of the emigration of skilled and
professional manpower (Lowell and Findlay, 2002; Wickramasekara, 2003).
Moreover, there is more awareness of the potential to benefit from the
highly-skilled diaspora – parts of the discourse narrowed down to the
privileged group of migrants. Capitalizing on the diaspora for development
purposes can be done through, e.g., the facilitation of return migration or
involving the diaspora through circulation, business networking, virtual
return and information exchange. A good example is the Thai Reverse Brain
Drain project started in 1997 under the auspices of the National Science and
Technology Development Agency of Thailand (NSTDA).4 Migrants’ skills,
networks and financial resources/remittances should be mobilized to pro-
mote capacity building, technology transfer and private investments (IOM,
2003).
Thus, brain drain can evolve into what has been coined ‘brain-gain,” or
even “brain circulation” (Hugo, 2003), if expatriates are enticed to (tempo-
rarily) return home, or, when the exchange of knowledge, investments and
business cooperation is facilitated through circulation.5 A striking example
is that of expatriate IT workers in Silicon Valley fostering the development
of businesses in India and China (Saxenian, 2000; Hunger, 2002). It is crucial
to create an enabling environment where opportunities for investments,
4 See the Reverse Brain Drain project’s website: http://rbd.nstda.or.th/index.html
5 On the role of the highly qualified migrants in the transformation process of Eastern
Europe, see Rudolph and Hillmann (1998).
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innovation and business creation are maximized. Emigration of skilled
workers can also have positive spin-off effects in terms of remittances and
a stimulus to follow and invest more in higher education, thereby enhancing
the human capital resources.
Apart from involvement in business, returning migrants also have a
role to play in the transformation of domestic political and administrative
systems through their newly acquired skills, ideas and authority. Skeldon
(2004:16), for instance, notes that return migrants are important players in
the parliaments of Asia’s new industrialized countries. The influence of
returning nationals in domestic politics and government is also manifest
elsewhere, for instance, as exemplified by the Philippine Overseas Absentee
Voting Law, passed in 2003.
Next to stressing the positive role of remittances and the brain gain, the
discourse shift pays attention to the role of migrant diasporas in develop-
ment. The migrant diasporas can be involved in local development efforts,
without necessarily returning permanently to the country of origin. This
could also include second and third generation migrants, for whom the
“country of origin” is rather the country of their forebears. Furthermore,
diasporas are becoming more and more active in advocacy, networking and
projects aimed at involvement of their countries of origin.6 The involvement
of the diaspora also takes place in disaster and (post-)conflict situations
whereby migrants in the diaspora pool funds for relief or reconstruction
efforts, e.g., in Sri Lanka and Indonesia (Cheran, 2003; Steijlen, 2004).
As has been articulated by different observers (Wickramasekara, 2003),
optimizing the involvement of the diaspora, including transnational entre-
preneurs would presuppose the facilitation of circular migration. This,
however, runs counter to the tendency of developed countries governments
to implement restrictive policies towards population movement and immi-
gration. Skeldon (2004:6) points out that immigration polices are not recon-
cilable with more flexible labor recruitment regimes, e.g., GATS mode 4,7
but in the short term, seem to leave room for the mobility of certain
categories of migrants, such as intra-corporate transferees, highly-skilled
service workers, entrepreneurs and trainees.
6 The number of diaspora networks are quite numerous and involve many regions and
nationalities. Hugo (2003) provides examples for Asia while Turner et al. (2003) lists fifty-seven
diaspora networks in ten Asian countries including networks of ICT professionals, engineers
and physicians.
7 Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), in force since 1995, refers
to the movement in natural persons, i.e., a person travelling to supply services in another
country (see Lavenex, 2004).
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For a more balanced assessment of the benefits of migration for the
development of sending countries, we also need to take into account the
social costs entailed by migration. International migration often implies the
separation of spouses, disrupted families, children having to cope without
parents, increased inequality and friction in communities and considerable
psychological strain on migrants and those left behind. Moreover, the
current trend in feminization of migration also implies a higher vulnerabil-
ity to exploitation and (sexual) abuse (IOM, 2004d; Wets, 2004).
Linking Migration and Development in European Policy
In Europe, the thinking about the relationship between migration and
development was mainly framed in the context of return flows of former
guest workers and asylum seekers. During the late 1970s and 1980s, when
economic recession hit the European economies and guest-worker migra-
tion was put to an end, governments became more aware of the economic
effects of migration for both immigration and emigration countries. Eco-
nomic restructuring, rising unemployment and social tensions brought
about a policy orientation towards return migration, translating into indi-
rect measures such as quota systems or temporary residence permits (France,
Belgium, Netherlands), or more direct incentives to foster return migration
(Germany, Belgium, Netherlands).
Nevertheless, there was some concern over the effect of massive return
migration of redundant workers in terms of labor market reintegration
(Tassello, 1986:126). This instigated a report by the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on migration, growth and
development (Kindleberger, 1978), that called for devising appropriate
mechanisms for the reintegration of migrants and supporting employment
generation projects in origin countries. The Netherlands’ experience with
the Reintegration of Emigrant Manpower and Local Opportunities for
Development (REMPLOD) project in 1977, which is discussed in a latter
section,  provides insights into policy issues.
In recent years the debate on the migration-development nexus has
widened beyond the economic dimension and acknowledges the multifari-
ous linkages between the countries of origin and destination. Nevertheless,
repatriation and reintegration are still important elements in European migra-
tion policies,  although they do not necessarily address development issues
in the long term. Assisted voluntary return (AVR) programs have increas-
ingly been seen as a viable option, as  suggested by the increasing number
of  AVR programs. In 1979 only Germany  had such a program called
Remigration and Emigration for Asylum Seekers in Germany (REAG); in
2004, 20 AVR programs were implemented by 18 European countries,
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including the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Austria (IOM, 2004a;
Black  and  Koser et al., 2004). The voluntary return programs aim to
facilitate the permanent return of legal and  unauthorized migrants by
reintegrating the returnees socially and economically in the origin commu-
nity. Thus, it fits the policy aim of many programs to  limit future migration
flows (OCIV, 2001).
Return migration is potentially a means of contributing to the develop-
ment of countries of origin. The assumption is that migrants acquire knowl-
edge, skills and capital in the receiving countries that can be used produc-
tively in their country of origin upon their return.8 However, the successful
application of these human, social and financial resources can be hampered
by all kinds of constraints, including an unfavorable economic environment,
unstable political and security situation, lack of institutional support, inef-
ficient bureaucracy, corruption, inadequate capital markets, local competi-
tion or a mismatch of skills. Therefore, several prerequisites are necessary
for return migration to contribute to local development efforts. Moreover,
the active participation of (local) government and other stakeholders in the
country of origin is necessary in the planning and implementation phases.
At present the different EU countries still lack a clear, integrated and
uniform policy in the field of return migration, reintegration and develop-
ment (AGEF, 2004). Although many return and reintegration programs are
implemented by various governmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions, these programs are carried out independently of each other and
without clear coordination. In a number of countries - e.g. Spain, Greece,
Italy and Ireland - the issue is almost absent on the political agenda. Only
Denmark and the Netherlands have special laws on return migration.
Hitherto, the number of countries that have managed to forge a strong link
between return, reintegration and (local) development in the countries of
origin are still few.9 The set-up of such programs requires more coordination
across relevant government departments and developing an adequate legal
basis, taking into account the different legal statuses of the migrants and the
variety of origin country contexts.
More recently, the role of diasporas in development projects became visible,
not the least because of the efforts of migrant organizations. A major
8 Early initiatives taken in this field are UNDP’s ‘Transfer of Know-how Through Expatriate
Nationals’ (TOKTEN) program started in 1976 and IOM’s ‘Return of Qualified African
Nationals’ program carried out during 1983-1999 (Trotzki  and  Schuman, 2002:50).
9 Some countries have piloted programs that foster development,  such as support for
business start-ups. For details, see European Reintegration Networking: http://
www.reintegration.net/laender/index.htm
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initiative was the Euro-Moroccan conference in Tangiers (1996), which led
to a number of meetings and conferences in Morocco and Europe on
migration and development, and ultimately to the Euro-Moroccan network
on Migration and Development in 2002.10 From the viewpoint of govern-
mental aid agencies, however, private development projects taken up by the
diaspora are not embedded in a well thought out general development
strategy and may lack a firm professional basis. On the other hand, migrant
organizations and NGOs can view these attempts at integrating diaspora
activities with formal development aid as unnecessary since they consider
themselves capable of running the programs in an efficient and autonomous
way. In the Dutch debate, as discussed below,  many small-scale diaspora
organizations involved in development projects have articulated distrust
about state intervention; for this reason, they maintain separate aid initia-
tives. The two channels are not usually compatible in that official develop-
ment aid mostly targets the poorest people and areas, while migrants are not
necessarily from the poorest strata or countries.
Migration and development aid now also figure in the European debate.
Governments have attempted to promote development as a means to
alleviate the adverse conditions causing underdevelopment and conflict,
while at the same time reducing propensities for migration to Europe. In this
respect, the French policy of co-developpement, instigated after 1997, serves as
a kind of model. It attempts to forge a link between immigration (control)
with development processes in sending countries. It built on already estab-
lished transnational development initiatives by the African diaspora in
France. The policy advocates possibilities for temporary immigration for
(vocational) training or facilitation of business creation, next to more con-
ventional measures such as repatriation support. It specifically aims to
involve regional state agencies, migrants’ associations and business and
professional networks. The rationale is that by boosting development in
countries of origin, migration pressures will be reduced.
This policy spurred considerable debate at the national and EU levels
and remains controversial for some, particularly because of its (supposed)
connection with immigration control (Aumüller, 2004a). In 2001 the Euro-
pean Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs Antonio Vitorino advo-
cated a co-development policy that ensures “migrants have possibilities of
moving on or going back as the situation develops in their country of origin
and elsewhere in the world…[including] innovative ideas to encourage the
voluntary return of migrants …in a framework of supported reintegration
in countries of origin…[and] reduce the negative factors associated with
10 At present around two million Moroccans are living in Western Europe.
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emigration and ensure longer term benefits, particularly for developing
countries” (Migration News, 2001).
However, various consultations with agencies such as ILO and OECD
and submission of proposals on the issue have yet to be translated into
coherent, comprehensive migration-oriented and development aid policy.
According to Aumüller (2004b), this is due to a lack of research and
knowledge on the issue. Moreover, development aid agencies are reluctant
to execute policies with the underlying motive to stem (the alleged or real)
mass influx of refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants. The linking
of development aid with migration policy remains contentious (Baschle,
2004), and to a certain extent, it is a sensitive issue in the development
cooperation circles.
Nevertheless, on a higher level, the EU has taken first steps to forge a
stronger link between the migration and development policies. A decade
ago the European Commission (EC) signaled the need for more cooperation
with migrant sending countries in a bid to reduce migration pressure on
Europe. But it was only in 2002 that the Commission publicized a document
specifically addressing the theme of migration and development (EC, 2002).
The EU underscored the necessity of integrating migration issues in its
relations with third countries, including a more harmonized migration
admission policy that takes the interests of the EU and sending countries into
account.  At the European Council meeting in Seville, Spain in June 2002, the
EC decided to include actions on the joint management of migration flows
and readmission of  unauthorized migrants (EC, 2003a: 39). The conclusions
reached at the EC meeting hinted at a reevaluation of relations in cases of
countries that do not show sufficient cooperation in the fight against
unauthorized migration.
Migration in general is to be integrated into a comprehensive external
policy of the EU, linking migration and development issues. It is increasingly
recognized that the reduction of international migration cannot be realized
only by restrictive immigration policies, but that the conditions in the origin
countries in the developing world also need to improve. This implies
fostering progress in human rights and conflict prevention, economic con-
ditions and the labor market, food security, health and the environment.
Thus, a more integrative EU policy was announced in 2002 that should
not only address the management of migration flows and host country
integration issues, but also the root causes of migration, repatriation of
immigrants and asylum-seekers, reintegration of migrants in origin coun-
tries and the promotion of the role of the diaspora in the development (cf.
EC, 2004c). The latter implies the more efficient and productive mobiliza-
tion of financial resources and strengthening transnational communication
facilities of migrant communities. To these could be added measures aiming
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at fostering “brain-gain” through repatriation of skills, fostering circulation
of highly skilled labor between European and developing countries, and
refraining from harmful recruitment of professionals in short supply in
developing countries (EC, 2002,  2003b, 2005).
In March 2004, the Council of the European Union and European
Parliament officially adopted a program for financial and technical assis-
tance to third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (AENEAS). The
EU aims to intensify cooperation along a three- pronged strategy: 1) tackling
root causes of migration; 2) integrating migration issues in the political
dialogue with a focus on unauthorized as well as on channels for legal
migration, and 3) integrating migration in development cooperation pro-
grams to improve the capacity of developing countries to manage migration
flows (EC, 2004b:46). However, thus far, the emphasis in their regional pro-
grams still lies on migration management, countering unauthorized migra-
tion and border enforcement. Diaspora efforts in development are also
acknowledged. EC regulation No. 491/2004 does explicitly mention the EC
support for actions by third countries aimed at fostering the maintenance of
linkages between the diaspora  and their communities of origin and  facili-
tating their contributions to local social and economic development (EC,
2004b).
Asia-Europe Migration
Next to the economic importance of the Asian region for Europe, migration
flows from Asia to Europe have increased in recent years and have become
more diverse in terms of nationalities and types of migrants. Not only are
flows of asylum-seekers more apparent, e.g., from Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri
Lanka and China (Pieke et al., 2004), but also trafficked persons, unautho-
rized migrants (who transit via Eastern Europe) and, more recently, highly-
skilled workers including students and trainees (ICT, health and engineer-
ing). In particular, China is of significance for transnational ties and devel-
opment linkages, now that restrictions to mobility have been lifted, China’s
economy is booming and is becoming an important partner for business
networking.
Up until now, migration has not figured as an important issue in
European relations with Asian countries, but this will change given the
intensifying migration linkages between the two regions. Dialogues and
programs between Asia and Europe have hitherto been concerned with
readmission agreements, countering people smuggling/trafficking11 and
11 Two Regional Ministerial conferences on people smuggling and trafficking in human
beings were held in Bali in 2002/2003, where actions plans were initiated.
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refugees assistance. In Asia itself, the discourse has mainly focused on the
negative (socio-economic) impacts of temporary labor migration for the
countries of origin. Return migration of the less skilled is structural and
given.
As to Asia-EU relations, migration and trafficking have been incorpo-
rated into the regional and bilateral dialogues with Southeast Asian coun-
tries (EC, 2003a:5). In the migration field, the EU prefers bilateral coopera-
tion programs to suit the specific situation of the highly diverse Asian
countries (EC, 2004). In the EC strategy paper (EC, 2003a:12) unauthorized
migration is considered harmful for development and is targeted for inter-
vention within the framework of an integrated and holistic policy frame-
work:
Moreover, the EC takes a holistic approach to its broadened policy
agenda, acknowledging the inter-relationship of different issues
and addressing them through integrated policies. Thus, terrorism,
organized crime and illegal migration undermine the rule of law,
discourage investment, and hinder development.
Furthermore, the EU Regional Strategy paper on Asia (EC, 2004) states
that:
Migration takes an increasingly prominent role in the relations
between the two continents and also in discussions at official level.
Asia is the source of potentially significant – documented and non-
documented - migratory flows to Europe. The EU and Asian coun-
tries have started a dialogue on this common challenge in the
context of ASEM12 and are beginning to develop common ap-
proaches at bilateral level.
However, as of yet, the EC cooperation with ASEAN currently does not
clearly and explicitly include migration and development issues. Similarly, the
Hanoi Declaration on Closer ASEM Economic Partnership (Hanoi, 9 Octo-
ber 2004), while aiming at the strengthening of business, investment oppor-
tunities and the trade in goods and services, does not mention migration
issues specifically.
Thus, the emphasis in EU-Asian cooperation in the field of migration is
still on control of migration flows, readmission of migrants and countering
unauthorized migration and trafficking within the framework of
mainstreaming Justice and Home Affairs issues (EC, 2003a:39; EC, 2004b).
This is done through exchange of information, training of immigration
12 Asia Europe Meeting
47SHIFTS IN MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSES
officials, capacity building and improvement of border control systems.13
For the Southeast Asian region, the program is still tentative and in a phase
of orientation and identification of possible areas of cooperation. The
dialogue within ASEM and ASEAN priority is given to  anti-trafficking
projects (EC, 20004b).
As to highly skilled and professional migrants, the EU supports the
training, mobility and return of scientific personnel and trainees. Within the
context of the Asia-Link program, the EU aims to foster the involvement of
expatriate scientists with their countries of origin.14 In addition, due to the
shortage of highly skilled workers in sectors such as ICT and health, several
European countries have entered into bilateral agreements with Asian
countries for the supply of these workers. For instance, Germany and the UK
have allowed for the immigration of Indian engineers and ICT workers.
Next to that there is an increasing demand for unskilled labor in care and
domestic services, but this flow, however, is less regulated.
In the next two sections we will focus on the shift in discourses in the
Netherlands and Germany, respectively. Comparing the Dutch and Ger-
man cases is interesting in that it highlights the contrasts in migration
experiences and thinking about transnational relations and immigrants’
contribution to their countries of origin. Østergaard-Nielsens’ (2000; 2001)
research, while focusing on the political participation of Turkish and Kurdish
immigrants, brings out the contrasting institutional and political contexts,
i.e., a more inclusive political system (Netherlands) against a more exclusive
system (Germany), and shows how both governments exhibit a sensitivity
towards “homeland politics.”15 Moreover, Østergaard-Nielsen asserts that
the Netherlands differs with Germany in terms of hosting migrant diasporas
that are more organized which support  more diaspora-development initia-
tives.
13 Concerns Hong Kong, China, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka.
14 The objective of the Asia-Link Program is to promote regional and multilateral network-
ing between higher education institutions in Europe, South and Southeast Asia and China.
Eligible countries are the 25 Member States of the European Union and 19 Asian countries.
15 According to Østergaard-Nielsens (2001), in the Netherlands, given its more inclusive
multicultural policies, there is a tendency among policymakers to view the taking part in
“homeland” politics by Turkish immigrants as a failure of immigrant incorporation and
integration policy.
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Dutch Discourses and Policies
In the case of the Netherlands, five periods characterized by a specific
economic conjuncture, type of immigration and subsequent discourse on
migration and development, can be distinguished:
1. The first wave of non-European immigration in the Netherlands
occurred shortly after World War II when 10,000 Indonesian-Dutch (mesti-
zos of the Dutch Indies) and Moluccan soldiers in the service of the colonial
army, left Indonesia. During the period of their arrival, from 1945 till about
1960, the Dutch economy and society underwent substantial changes. The
foundations were laid for a post-colonial industrial and welfare state. The
reconstruction went together with a tight labor market, and full employ-
ment facilitated the integration of the immigrants. The predicament of
developing countries was not really on the agenda, hence, there was no
debate on migration and its link with development.
2. During the next period, 1960-1973, like in other parts of Northwestern
Europe, sustained economic growth continued and  shortages in the labor
market led to the recruitment of foreign ‘guest workers,’ mainly from
Morocco and Turkey. This period ended with the so-called oil-crisis and the
coming to a standstill of the guest worker program. The first debates on the
relation between migration and development took place in this period,
focusing on the underlying reasons for migration (poverty) and ‘highly-
skilled migration.’ The latter, in particular, became part of ‘developmen-
talism’ (balanced growth) and ‘dependency’ (asymmetrical growth) dis-
courses and was consequently framed in terms of  ‘brain gain’ or ‘brain
drain.’
3. 1973-1990 was a period of recession and restructuring of the Dutch
economy that gradually evolved from a Fordist to a post-modern, service-
oriented and knowledge-based economy. Economic growth stagnated and
unemployment became widespread. Contrary to original expectations,
many guest workers stayed in the Netherlands, their families came over
under family reunification arrangements, and a large part of them obtained
Dutch nationality. Return migration became part of the migration and
development debate. In 1973 the Directorate–General for Development
Cooperation (DGIS) started a re-migration program called Reintegration of
Emigrant Manpower and Local Opportunities for Development (REMPLOD)
that lasted six years. Studies were carried out to evaluate the results and they
showed that although re-migration could be successful at the individual
level, at the village level sustainable positive effects remained to be seen
(Abadan-Unat, 1975).
4. In the period 1990-2000 the West European economy recovered and
the labor market improved. Intensified globalization and political repres-
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sion and civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and
Somalia caused an increase in the number of asylum seekers and refugees.
The Netherlands was one of the countries that received this wave of
immigration.  Migrants’ origins became more diverse. With 15 percent of its
16-million population born outside the country or having at least one parent
born outside the country,16 Dutch society gradually became conscious of
being an immigration country. Resistance against immigrants, especially
asylum seekers, increased.
It is against this background that a new discourse - the causes of
migration/brain drain and return migration – appeared.    The first issue was
taken up mostly at the theoretical level (e.g., see Heins and Kox, 1998) while
the latter was translated in policies. Successive governments spent millions
to promote the return of asylum seekers and migrants to the countries of
origin. Three re-migration programs were launched, none of them success-
ful.17 To these discourses a third discourse was added focusing on
transnationalism and the role of migrant communities or diasporas. After
1990, the role of diasporas in development projects increasingly received
more attention, not the least because of the efforts of migrant organiza-
tions.18
5. The current period, from 2000 till the present, is characterized by
economic recession, an increase in the level of unemployment, and immi-
gration as a core issue in Dutch politics. Like in other European countries,
the Dutch asylum policy has become more and more restrictive, intensifying
the discourse of return migration and development in the process. On April
1, 2000 the Law on Re-migration became effective. It aims at facilitating the
return of accepted asylum seekers and migrants who want to return volun-
16 Regarding the Dutch definition of the ‘allochtonous’ population, allochtones should not
be seen as synonymous  with foreigners since many of them had Dutch nationality when they
migrated from the former colonies; many others obtained Dutch nationality. The largest groups
are those of Dutch-Indonesian (450,000), Surinamese (325,000), Turkish (350,000) and Moroc-
can (250,000) descent. New large immigrant groups are from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, China,
Ghana and Somalia.
17 These programs are: 1) Return and Emigration of Asylum Seekers ex Netherlands
(REAN), under which program 6,700 people returned between January 1992 and May 1998; 2)
Facilitated Return of non-Accepted Asylum Seekers (GTAA), which assisted the return of 900
asylum seekers from Ethiopia and 300 from Angola;  at the beginning of 2000 only 13 asylum
seekers had returned; and 3) Facilitated Return to Somalia-  no one returned under this
program.
18 Examples are the Euro-Mediterranean Center of Migration and Development (http://
www.emcemo.nl/), and a conference organized by  the National Consultation of Municipali-
ties and Development (LOGO), where organizations of migrant communities and Dutch
development organizations discussed opportunities for cooperation (Posthumus, 1996).
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tarily to their home countries. The Netherlands Migration Institute, on
behalf of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, implements the Law, which
provides transport costs and financial assistance for the first two months. In
addition to the law, political developments in Iraq and Afghanistan invited
return migration and development projects in these countries. The Dutch
European Refugees Fund (Nederlandse Europees Vluchtelingen Fonds), for
example, allocated more than one million euros for return migration in 2003.
What is new is the involvement of development funding agencies such
as Cordaid, Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO),
Netherlands Organization for International Development Cooperation or
NOVIB (Oxfam Netherlands). For example, Cordaid started an organiza-
tion (Bureau Maatwerk voor Terugkeer’= Office for Tailor Made Return), with the
aim to mediate between rejected asylum seekers and the demand of devel-
opment organizations in countries of origin. However, their efforts have yet
not proven to be effective, among others because: “It is characteristic of the
projects that they target people who have been for years involved in asylum
procedures, who are not accepted and who receive welfare without much
perspective for work. Seldom had the discussion focused on the return of
people who belong to the better-off of the refugee population” (Kalsbeek,
2003:3). Nevertheless, it is significant that migration is now on the agenda
of development NGOs.
The discourse on migration and development received a new impetus
with the publication of a policy paper ‘Development and Migration,’ writ-
ten on behalf of both the Minister of Development Cooperation and the
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Integration. The paper aims at bringing into
balance policies of poverty alleviation, conflict management and protection
of human rights with the elasticity (‘spankracht’) of Dutch society regarding
legal and undocumented immigration and multiculturalism. In fact, the
report brings the three discourses discussed earlier together. A new element
is the framing of the migration and development issue by paying attention
to national and regional contexts. The central issue at stake is why migration
generates more positive effects in some countries compared to other coun-
tries.
The report focuses on two areas: remittances and human capacity
building. Remittances are considered beneficial  to countries with a favor-
able climate for entrepreneurs: “There are indications that in particular in
countries with a favorable climate for entrepreneurial activities remittances
will indeed lead to extra investments and, in situations with sufficient
surplus production capacity, to substantial economic growth. There are also
strong indications that the poor (although not the ultra poor) will benefit
from the remittances” (Royal Dutch Government, 2004:34). Human capac-
ity building is related to the role of diasporas, which  is supposed to generate
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trade relations, international capital transfers for investments and transfer
of technology. The general conclusion of the policy paper is that the effects
of international migration are positive for the middle income countries
because of economic opportunities to invest. The relation between interna-
tional migration and lower income countries is less clear. Of decisive
importance is the development environment: political stability, economic
growth, the quality of government, policy and business climate and whether
the emigrants are high or low skilled.
Based on this analysis, a new policy was devised. Among others, the
policy paper states that the government will involve migrant organizations
more intensively in the design of Dutch development cooperation and in the
debate on brain drain. Moreover, efforts of migrant organizations to contrib-
ute to development in the countries of origin will be supported. It further
considers the promotion of circular migration as a suitable strategy that
unifies the interests of the migrants, the countries of origin and the destina-
tion countries. These conclusions imply that governmental policy acknowl-
edges that the transnational linkages of migrant organizations contain a
potential for economic and political development in the home countries. In
the following paragraphs we will give some examples with regard to
diaspora organizations formed by migrants of Indonesian origin.
There are many local organizations and activities in the Netherlands
that support small-scale projects in Indonesia. The Moluccans who came to
the Netherlands around 1950 numbered about 42,000  as of 2001(Beets et al.,
2002). They originally assumed that their stay would be temporary and that
they would return to a free Moluccan republic. This ideal and the adat
(traditional law) and pela (kinship) linkages still play a role in constituting
the Moluccans as a migrant group with a clear, well-defined identity.
Kinship relations are also important in keeping the links with the Moluccan
Islands in East Indonesia. In 1999-2001 violent ethnic and religious conflicts
occurred in the region of origin, during which at least 5,000 people died and
500,000 were displaced. The Moluccans in the Netherlands undertook
various initiatives and demonstrations to express their solidarity; the latter
were joint efforts by Christian and Muslim Moluccans. Political pressure to
end the violence was exerted, both on politicians in the Netherlands and in
Indonesia, and twice a delegation of prominent members of the diaspora
visited political leaders in Indonesia. The diaspora also became much
involved in relief efforts. Campaigns were held to collect money, at the
national level by way of a national aid campaign supported by two Dutch
mayors and the Dutch Red Cross, as well as by numerous local actions. The
national campaign resulted in 5.5 million Dutch guilders (around 2.75
million euros) in 2001. Steijlen (2004) suggests that the interethnic conflict of
1999-2002 has strengthened transnational ties, and the emergency assis-
tance developed into development oriented small-scale projects.
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The second group is smaller and consists of Papuans from West Papua
(Irian Barat) that was separated by the Dutch from the rest of Indonesia
during the transfer of sovereignty in 1949.  Given their small number, there
are only a few diaspora organizations of Papuans. The core members consist
of Papuans but their membership includes Dutch sympathizers. Hulp aan
Papua’s in Nood (HAPIN), which stands for ‘Support to Papuans in distress,’
is a case in point. It claims to have 12,000 member-contributors. It combats
human rights abuses by the army and supports the regional autonomy and
decentralization laws of Indonesia that should lead to greater inclusion of
Papuans in regional decision making. HAPIN also has various project
activities, such as support to four boarding schools, emergency aid, infor-
mation, and support to refugees in Papua New Guinea. In 2003/04 grants
were given to 450 students for higher education both in West Irian and
elsewhere in Indonesia. Besides, a small fund supports initiatives of local
populations in the field of small scale production and education.19
The above examples demonstrate how the relations between migrant
groups and their countries of origin could be inter-generational and main-
tained for decades. They also show the current interest in mobilizing the
resources of migrant organizations for development. This interest is not
only from the side of Dutch private or semi-governmental funding agencies,
but also from the Dutch government. An example of an Asian initiative
supported by the Dutch government is a project of the Dutch-Filipino
organization PASALI, an organization of Filipino seafarers. It initiated a
project “from brain drain to brain gain,” with the aim to use the knowledge
and skills of expatriate Filipinos to develop the fishery and agricultural
sector; to foster the economic and social reintegration of returnees and to
help avoid the migration of Filipino graduates (IOM, 2004c).
The discourse on transnationalism and development is, of course, not
only a matter for policymakers; it is also a matter of academic interest.
Gradually, more academic work has been done on the subject and three
Dutch studies will be highlighted here that show different results. The study
of Janine Klaver (1997) on labor migration from Oaxaca (Mexico) to the USA
is one of the first Dutch studies on transnationalism, based on fieldwork in
two villages in the Oaxaca region and the diaspora community in Los
Angeles. It pays much attention to cross-border social networks. Labor
migration is a major livelihood strategy for many Oaxaqueños, but, accord-
19  Since 2002, this fund is supported by the Dutch funding organization NOVIB (Oxfam
Netherlands),  which allowed for expanding assistance programs. The LINKIS/NOVIB Pro-
gram is meant for co-financing of  small scale development projects of Dutch civil society
organizations, including migrant and refugee organizations (see www.linkis.nl).
53SHIFTS IN MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSES
ing to the researcher, on balance the effects of migration on the social and
economic development are negative, both at household and village level.
Adverse effects are the lack of adult males in the villages (although more and
more young women migrate); the neglect of investments to increase pro-
duction; and the increase in fallow land and the decrease of land cultivation.
While incoming remittances increase the standard of living, it leads to ever-
higher expectations and ambitions. While migrants support individuals
and migrant organizations support public works in the villages of origin, the
idea of solidarity and mutual assistance weakens in due time.
A study in Indonesia (Spaan, 1999) showed that labor migration (either
internal or international) was part of strategies adopted by households
across all socio-economic strata in the study sites to diversify the house-
holds’ resource base. International labor migration was more prominent in
communities with a high degree of development and economic incorpora-
tion in the wider economy. The poor and landless managed to cover the
initial costs of migration by taking loans and using the services offered by
intermediaries (as against paying placement fees to recruitment agencies).
The investment patterns of migrants varied by socio-economic stratum:
poorer migrant households tended to use earnings for housing, livestock
and repaying debts, while more well-endowed migrant households in-
vested more in productive assets such as land, transportation, tools or
accumulated savings. In some areas, the local government benefited by
appropriating a percentage of migrant remittances for infrastructure projects.
The high brokerage fees and ensuing debts, however,  prevented many
migrants from making productive investments. These intermediaries, often
return migrants, were important investors and served as catalysts of local
economic development (Spaan  and  Hartveld, 2002).
The third study by Hein de Haas (2003) analyzes migration and devel-
opment in an agricultural area in southern Morocco. For more than three
decades cross-border migration to Western Europe is part of households’
coping strategies. Many of the migrants obtained a permanent permit to
stay, others returned while there are also circular migrants as well as legal
and undocumented migrants. According to IMF data, remittances to Mo-
rocco totaled US$3.3 billion in 2001 (Nyberg Sorensen, 2004:5). In his study
area, De Haas estimates the annual value of remittances at some 12.2 million
euros. This is spent on the improvement of agriculture by buying water
pumps, fertilizers, agricultural machines; housing; education; the Muslim
pilgrimage to Mecca; purchase of luxury consumption goods, etc. In addi-
tion, diaspora organizations support communities by supporting hospitals
and building new mosques. De Haas shows that there is more prosperity
than before, that traditional cleavages the between traditionally powerful
and marginal groups are eroded, and that women are more educated than
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before. On the other hand, he admits that the poorest families are not (able
to be) involved in the migration culture and that there is an increasing
agrarian inequality. De Haas’ study exceeds narrow interpretations of
‘development’ as purely an economic process.
In summary, the different findings of these studies support the thesis
that the context determines the outcome of transnational linkages. Besides,
the three studies together mark the transition in the Dutch migration and
development debate from a rather skeptical and pessimistic point of view
towards a more positive and optimistic one.
The German Discourse on Migration and Development
Also in the case of Germany it is helpful to distinguish periods marked by
specific economic and political characteristics, type of immigration and
subsequent discourses on migration and development. Germany’s immi-
gration history is marked by a paradox. In post-war Europe Germany
became one of the most prominent immigrant countries – even if there was
no declared policy towards immigration and integration. But it was only in
1998, 43 years after the first recruited migrant laborers came, that Germany
declared itself officially to be an immigration country. From the outset, the
access of migrants to the labor market was highly regulated, and the
regulations were contradictory (Bade, 2001).
1. After the collapse of the Nazi-regime with its anti-Semitic and racist
policies towards migration and its extensive use of forced labor, Germany
was confronted with remarkable streams of refugees. Most refugees came
from the Eastern territories and fled to Western Germany. Internal migra-
tion was directed nearly exclusively towards Western Germany as well.
This first phase of migration ended in 1961 when the Berlin Wall was raised
and internal migration between the two German states was blocked. West-
ern Germany started to prosper economically as a result of the Marshall
Plan, but it was short of labor.   Recruiting from the refugee population and
other solutions (such as increasing the participation of women in the labor
market) were not on the political agenda.
2. The import of migrant labor turned out to be a reasonable solution to
the labor shortage for the economic and political actors in this period. From
the outset the recruitment of workers was directed towards European
countries and potential immigrants coming from Asia or Africa were
excluded. In principle, it was less  a preference for ‘Europeans’ but the
exclusion of individuals who, in internal parlance, were frequently referred
to as ‘Afro-Asians’ (Schönwälder, 2004:249). The recruitment of thousands
of workers, mainly from Southern European regions took, place from 1955
onwards and was managed by a loose coalition of big enterprises in the
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booming industries and the German government. It was not accompanied
by an integration policy for the immigrants. Contracts for the recruited
workers were made originally on a one-year basis. The main countries of
recruitment at the time were Italy, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal and the
former Yugoslavia. Initially, countries like Bolivia, Taiwan, India, Iran,
Togo, the West Indies and the Central African Federation had offered to
send workers to West Germany. However, Germany rejected those offers;
later it accepted workers from Morocco and Tunisia. The recruitment
treaties did not contain provisions on the immigration of family members
of the recruited workers. This made it difficult for immigrants from devel-
oping countries to bring their families to Germany. In 1973 the German
government stopped its recruitment policies due to the oil crisis and eco-
nomic recession (Rist, 1980).20
3. Since 1973, the third phase of migration to West Germany continued
through three modes: special agreements covering the recruitment of (sea-
sonal) workers; the repatriation of so-called ethnic Germans from Eastern
Europe (people having German descent), and asylum and refugee migra-
tion. These migrations were regulated directly (e.g., visa requirements) and
indirectly (e.g., the treatment of spouses and children who were admitted
under family reunification). Many of the immigrants stemming from the
guest worker system brought their families to Germany, indicating a con-
solidation of this immigrant generation (Bade, 2001).
In addition, Germany forged special agreements with several countries
for the benefit of certain sectors  that needed  qualified workers. In the 1970s
and 1980s there was already a limited inflow of Korean and Philippine
nurses to Western Germany. Those two immigration groups were largely
female; unlike the guest worker program, there was no possibility for them
to bring their spouses and children to Germany21 In the late 1970s refugees
from Vietnam (known as the ‘boat people’) were also allowed to come to
Western Germany. They received institutional support and, compared to
other refugee groups, they integrated rather quickly into the Western
German society.
In this phase the idea that poor countries should not be deprived of their
well-educated personnel dominated the debate on the recruitment of work-
ers from developing countries. Left-liberals criticized the recruitment of
20 In that year 72,946 African and Asian citizens, representing 3.11 percent of the foreign
workforce, were gainfully employed in Germany. The total number of foreigners in Germany
was about four million persons  (Schönwälder, 2004:254).
21 Most of the South Koreans already came to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s as nurses or
miners. Filipino migrants had lived in Germany for many years and often work as nurses
(women) or as seafarers (men) (see Schmidt-Fink, 2004).
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nurses from South Korea  since it also had a shortage of medical personnel
(Schönwälder, 2004:258). The brain drain debate was high on the agenda
and the concept of brain drain itself became a highly politicized issue (see
Schipulle, 1976:193). Germany’s repatriation policies focused on the guest
worker population. A program launched in 1983 offered incentives for
return migrants to Southern Europe. It did not meet the expectations of the
government and it ceased within a few years (Entenmann, 2002).
East Germany (German Democratic Republic or GDR) followed its own
recruitment strategies. The GDR recruited workers (so called Werkvertrag-
sarbeiter) from a variety of socialist developing countries in the 1980s and
1990s, mostly from Cuba, Mozambique and Vietnam. In this case the
migration policies did not invite the permanent stay of migrants in the GDR.
The immigrants lived in segregated condominiums and had little contact
with the country of destination. The most numerous group of immigrants
were the Vietnamese. They were able to maintain a strong relationship with
their country of origin and they sent all kinds of goods to their country on
a regular basis (Hillmann, 2005).
4. After reunification in October 1990 many immigrants living in the
former GDR were not captured by an appropriate legal framework and,
subsequently, became a main target of repatriation policies. Statistics sug-
gest that about 19,500 out of 60,000 Vietnamese left the country for good in
the years after reunification. Arbeitsgruppe Entwicklung und Fachkräfte im
Bereich der Migration und Zusammenarbeit (AGEF), an official mediator for
migrant reintegration in Vietnam, estimates that nation-wide about 12,000
Vietnamese went back to their home country in the 1990s (Hillmann, 2005).
While Germany wanted the former contract workers to return home,
Vietnam itself was not keen to have those migrants back because of its own
economic problems.
Up until today the immigrant population in Germany, though highly
diverse, is still mainly “European,” except in the eastern parts of the country.
In the year 2002 about 12 per cent of all foreigners came from Asia (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2002). Asian immigrants are a diverse group; they came to
Germany in various ways. It may be recalled that the Filipinos and Koreans
were part of specific recruitment agreements;  as detailed below, all other
groups did too under certain labor market regulations. Today, a substantial
proportion of the immigrant population lives under uncertain conditions,
as asylum seekers or as “tolerated immigrants” who do not have the right
to work in Germany. Among Vietnamese, Afghan and Sri Lankan immi-
grants, less than a fourth held  an unlimited permit to stay in 2002 (Beauftragte
der Bundesregierung,  2003). In addition,  there are  migrants without a legal
status; they work in the informal sector of the economy (Schönwälder, Vogel
and Sciortino, 2004). Furthermore, possibilities for self-employment were
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for many years restricted  due to complex bureaucratic procedures. Stu-
dents from developing countries are allowed to stay in Germany, but only
since January 2005, when the new law on immigration was passed allowing
them to stay for another year to find work in the labor market.
The biggest immigrant group from Asia, the Vietnamese, is now mainly
engaged in self-employment. The second group, the Chinese, came mainly
as specialty cooks since the 1960s.  More recent arrivals came mainly to study
at German universities. In 2003, 9,109 Chinese were registered as students
at German universities. It is estimated that many Chinese immigrants today
stay illegally in Germany and that this kind of immigration is on the rise
(Giese, 2003). Immigrants from Thailand include women who had been
trafficked (IOM, 2003b). Large numbers of Thai women also came in the
context of marriage migration. Data indicate that in the year 2002 2,775
marriages were registered between Thai women and German men, while
marriages between Thai men and German women are exceptional.22
In 2000 the so-called “Green card” program was introduced to bring in
about 20,000 highly specialized IT-workers to Germany. In 2003 half of the
13,774 recruited IT- workers came from India. The “Green Card” program
marked the beginning of a new era of immigration policies in Germany
because it implied that Germany should make more use of its integration
into global labor markets.
Policies of Return and Repatriation
As this brief review of Germany’s immigration context shows, the access of
immigrants to the country and to the labor market was highly regulated
from the outset. As in the case of the Netherlands, Germany also imple-
mented repatriation policies. Limited data on the dimensions of voluntary
repatriation are available and there is no central coordination of actions in
this respect; an evaluation of repatriation programs is  also lacking (Moritz,
2005; Entenmann, 2002). Several institutions are involved at various levels
and there is a growing consensus among policy makers that return pro-
grams should be given more attention than was the case in the past
(Unabhängige Kommission Zuwanderung, 2001).
In cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM),
Germany came up with the program, “Remigration and Emigration for
Asylum seekers in Germany” (REAG), in 1979. The program aimed at
22  In comparison 26 marriages between a German woman and a Thai man were registered
in 2002 (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration und Integration, 2004).
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assisting migrants and refugees willing to return to their countries of origin.
The program provided travel subsidies and reintegration assistance through
income-subsidies in the country of arrival under the Government Assisted
Repatriation Program (GARP). In the years 1979 to 2003 a total of 543,052
migrants availed of the program (IOM, 2005b:153). At the national level,
return programs involve three agencies: the Ministry of Labor, specifically
the Zentralstelle für Arbeitsvermittlung (ZAV) unit, which takes care of
migrants who have studied in Germany and  who want to return to their
countries of origin; the Ministry of Internal Affairs (BMI), and the Ministry
for Development (BMZ), which  run special programs to facilitate the return
of migrants and refugees.23
At the local community level some authorities offer economic help to
migrants willing to go back to their countries of origin (Entenmann, 2002).
Mediatory agencies as well as church organizations are also involved in
carrying out repatriation programs. Generally three forms of return pro-
grams exist: (1) financial and organizational help for the trip back home,
including financial support during the initial  stage in the country of return,
(2) programs for the economic reintegration of employees in the form of
training and job exchange, and  (3) financial support, access to credit and
consultancy services  in setting up  a business. Large-scale programs are
directed towards certain groups of migrants, for example Bosnian refugees,
while small-scale programs are more tailored to individuals. Recently a
special unit, ZIRF (Zentralstelle für Informationsvermittlung zur
Rückkehrförderung), has been created to coordinate and organize the
return programs and to enable potential returnees better to do so (Moritz,
2005).
The Shift in the Discourse: Empirical Evidence
Even if Germany did not favor the settlement of migrants from developing
countries (and had, in fact, recently created ZIRF, an institutional body to
better coordinate the return of migrants back to their home-country), the
debate on migration and development  surfaced in Germany in the past two to
three years. The policy of the 1970s and 1980s viewed the emigration of
highly qualified migrants from the developing countries, labeled as ‘brain
drain,’ as detrimental to the development of the countries of origin. This
argument justified the practice of sending students from developing coun-
23 Germany  has agreements on repatriation with several other countries such as Algeria,
Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Morocco, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic and
the Baltic states (Sachverständigenrat, 2004).
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tries back home once they obtained a university degree in Germany.
Generally the discourse on migration and development has shifted away
from the stigmatized brain drain debate, and now underlines aspects of the
brain gain (see Hunger, 2003).
In this changed debate the focus now is on the more positive effects of
return migration for the countries of origin. Migration, it is argued, becomes
a tool for development and transnational networks might lead to a win-win
situation in the country of arrival and in the country of origin. This line of
thinking challenges the notion that improved development strategies for
the developing countries could prevent migration from poorer countries to
the rich countries (Thränhardt, 2005).
This shift in the discourse is due to two major trends: (1) a new, more
transnational understanding of ‘development’ within globalization pro-
cesses, which includes the influence of international policy-oriented NGOs
in the field of migration studies; and (2) changed local realities in Germany
itself.
As regards the first trend, proponents of the discourse on migration and
development in Germany are oriented toward the Anglo-Saxon discourse -
they compare the situation of migrants in Germany with that of the UK or
the US, even if the level of organization of the immigrant communities as
well as the status and the possibilities for integration differ among the
various countries. Often reference is made to the economically successful
examples of global diasporas like the Indians and Chinese. The guanxi
model of the overseas Chinese community is seen as a viable resource for
many migrants all over the globe. Melchers et al. (2004) blame the migration
experts in Germany  in putting too much attention to the ‘negative’ aspects
of immigration to Germany  while failing to pay sufficient attention  to
transnational forms of migration, including diasporas. Some of the more
policy-oriented scholars now call for a better integration of the diaspora into
development policies (Kuptsch and Martin, 2004; Süßmuth, 2004). As in the
Anglo-Saxon discourse, diasporas in Germany are now examined more and
more as a potential tool for poverty-reduction in the countries of origin. The
‘Anglo-Saxon conception that “individuals constitute the most sizable and
tangible form of diaspora contribution to development and poverty reduc-
tion” (Van Hear et al., 2004:3) goes along with a changing view of migration.
Today the diaspora is seen as a provider of remittances and knowledge for
the developing countries. A better management of those remittances might
stimulate development at home. Some authors view Germany as not doing
much to  recognize the positive value  of its diaspora communities (Melchers
et al., 2003).
The second trend concerns changes in German society. The demo-
graphic trend shows a  decline in fertility rates and the greying of the
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“native” population. According to some experts, falling birth rates and the
anticipated problems of a shrinking society could be mitigated by immigra-
tion from abroad (Thränhardt, 2005). As mentioned earlier, Germany has
already allowed the access of highly-qualified workers to the IT- sector,
systemically recruiting workers from developing countries such as India for
this economic purpose.
Few scholars are aware that many assumptions about diasporas in
Germany are based  on limited knowledge of the nature and dynamics of
immigrant groups (Mundt, 2004). The available scientific evidence is much
more critical in tone than the briefly sketched debate here suggests. While
anecdotal evidence seems to highlight the success stories, more solid re-
search shows that the impact of the returns at the local level in the country
of origin are likely to be overestimated (for the Moroccan case, see Berriane,
2001) or that migrant groups would need other preconditions to invest in
their home countries. A study on the voluntary repatriation program of
Afghan refugees underlines the loose connection of migrants within the
diaspora and the difficulties of migrants in the country of destination and in
the country of origin (Schmidt, 2003). Research on Bangladeshi migrants in
Germany shows that most Bangladeshi came as refugees and that only one-
third of them send home remittances on a regular basis (Feuchte, 2002).
Ongoing research on the Ghanaian community in Germany indicates that
the ties between the diaspora and the home country exist, but these are
mostly based on an individual, non-organized fashion. While remittances
are sent back home, oftentimes this is not on a regular basis. Highly qualified
migrants stated that there was no need for them to send remittances home
since their families were well established there.
On the whole, the link between migration and development turns out
to be mixed: remittances are sent, but as empirical evidence suggests, these
are sent mostly in order to pay school bills and used for consumption or to
offer help in needy situations. Some of those who had tried to establish
development projects at home (e.g., sending medical-technical instruments),
turned out to be frustrated by the bureaucracy at home (e.g., high import
taxes) and cases of donated instruments being stolen. Similar skepticism is
indicated by a study on migrants who came to study in Germany and stayed
thereafter. Most of them have a strong emotional bond to their country of
origin, but very few have the financial freedom to visit their country of origin
every year (Schmelz, 2004). A study on the integration of refugee women in
the region of Berlin and Brandenburg indicates further that many migrants
from developing countries remain isolated in the county of arrival and that
their integration into the labor market is difficult, given the constraints they
face, and thus their economic resources are also limited (Foda and Kadur,
2004).
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Conclusion
As the overview attests, the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of
migration for the development process has not been conclusive. The debate
has long focused on issues such as remittance flows and brain drain, but
recently changed focus to issues such as brain circulation, transnational
migrant entrepreneurship, and diaspora linkages with local politics, societ-
ies and economies in countries of origin. The specific impacts of bilateral and
multilateral policies on these latter issues are hard to gauge since they are
recently initiated and still being debated. Furthermore, there seems to be
some association between the discourses and policies relating to immigra-
tion (control) and local development through return migration and diaspora
involvement.
The involvement of migrant diasporas in developments in their coun-
tries of origin is not something new; all kinds of diaspora initiatives for
development and reconstruction efforts have been going on for a long time.
Civil society and governmental involvement in this field is generally inde-
pendent. Recently, there are more attempts by governments to involve and
support return migrants and diaspora organizations in transnational devel-
opment polices and efforts. This is the case in France and the Netherlands;
at the EU level, awareness of this issue has grown.
In this respect, the Dutch case – which has a strong minority population
coming from developing countries – shows some optimism and the sense
that there are new opportunities for positive outcomes in linking migration
with development issues. In the German case, existing as well as ongoing
research on the relationship between migration and development point to
a mixed picture. In Germany, the available data on the numbers of immi-
grants from developing, especially Asian countries, does not at first sight
underline the thesis of strong diasporas that could shape a more effective
development policy vis-à-vis  the home countries. The potential of migrant
diasporas has not yet been recognized as such. Here a careful reading of the
Anglo-Saxon discourse would be appropriate.
Given the still underdeveloped policies linking international migration
and development, we underscore the conclusion made by Nyberg-Sorensen
et al. (2002) that the role of migrants as development agents should get more
weight in discourses and policies. This paper shows that there are differ-
ences in national frameworks where concrete policies take place – and that
the discourse is moving beyond the scope of repatriation. However, there
still tends to be an emphasis on economic aspects, while the social costs and
internal fragmentation in the countries of origin resulting from interna-
tional migration and transnationalism receive less attention. Finally, it
should be acknowledged that up to now knowledge about immigrant
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groups is limited and often glosses over the transnational aspects of migra-
tion. In other words, more definite conclusions regarding the role of diasporas
in development have to be postponed.
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